After all they were the only things that stood the test of this
bashing method of fighting and their very existence, when everything
else was destroyed, was ample proof of the fact. Tacticians from the
highest general to the platoon sergeant tried hard to discover the most
effective and least costly manner of "dealing with a pill-box," and the
highest in the land eagerly snatched at ideas from the man out of the
line if they bore the scent of feasibility about them.
One never knew if it was in pursuit of the solution of these tactical
problems that the higher command persisted during those sad August and
early September days in their policy of "minor" operations. Certainly no
part of the salient was ever at rest. Local attacks were launched here,
there and everywhere, but comparatively few succeeded, or if they did it
was merely a temporary success. While our advance parties were in the
line the Black Watch and the Gordons of the 15th division, executed a
night attack on "Gallipoli" and Hill 35, a job which had been previously
attempted, and very little advance was made. Those who had reached the
foremost position were immediately expelled or captured, or killed where
they stood, by the Boche counter attack next morning. Losses were very
heavy.
The 42nd took over the right portion of this front near the Frezenburg
Ridge, and the 61st division the left. Incidentally, the latter again
attempted Hill 35 but with equal success. The 125th brigade was given
one of these unfortunate tasks, with the 6th Manchesters in support.
Pages:
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87