Speaking very generally a unit
was made responsible for the defence of an area, and the principle of
defence was to hold it, not by successive lines of defence, but by a
series of mutually supporting posts arranged chequerwise and in depth.
This arrangement was intended to break up the enemy's attack formation,
to stop parts of it and to allow other parts to advance, but to advance
only in such places as would make them most vulnerable to
counter-attack. This principle applied also down to the company and even
the platoon. It is easily seen that a good deal of organisation was
demanded from the battalion commander, while the smallest unit
commander, perhaps a lance-corporal, was left with much responsibility.
In view of the possibly impending attack, Hebuterne was hurriedly put
into a sound state of defence by the untiring energy of Gen. Henley and
his subordinates. Whilst all this was going on our patrolling was
excessively active, and every night No Man's Land fell into our hands
right up to the enemy posts. If possible we were to "Snaffle a Hun" with
a view to identification and information about the supposed attack, and
when it was discovered that the Boche was too alert in spite of
persistent small attempts by the Manchesters and the L.F's. this was
regarded as good proof by the attack theorists. However, nothing
materialised beyond the steady arrival of Boche shells of all calibres,
and we were not sorry.
When the brigade moved out into reserve the 7th had to dig themselves
into the earth near Chateau-de-la-Haie north of Sailly-au-Bois.
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