Now we see that
governments differ in kind, and that some of them are prior and that
others are posterior; those which are faulty or perverted are
necessarily posterior to those which are perfect. (What we mean by
perversion will be hereafter explained.) The citizen then of necessity
differs under each form of government; and our definition is best
adapted to the citizen of a democracy; but not necessarily to other
states. For in some states the people are not acknowledged, nor have
they any regular assembly, but only extraordinary ones; and suits
are distributed by sections among the magistrates. At Lacedaemon,
for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which they
distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges of
homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates. A similar
principle prevails at Carthage; there certain magistrates decide all
causes. We may, indeed, modify our definition of the citizen so as
to include these states. In them it is the holder of a definite, not
of an indefinite office, who legislates and judges, and to some or all
such holders of definite offices is reserved the right of deliberating
or judging about some things or about all things. The conception of
the citizen now begins to clear up.
He who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial
administration of any state is said by us to be a citizens of that
state; and, speaking generally, a state is a body of citizens
sufficing for the purposes of life.
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