I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue
cannot be absolutely and always the same.
But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good
citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer
that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a
statesman must be a wise man. And some persons say that even the
education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the
children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As
Euripides says:
No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires.
As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then
the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we
assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the
virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be
absolutely the same, although in some cases they may; for the virtue
of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this
difference which made Jason say that 'he felt hungry when he was not a
tyrant,' meaning that he could not endure to live in a private
station. But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised
for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a
citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose
the virtue of a good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the
citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are
equally worthy of praise.
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