And if so, the
difficulty which has been already raised, and also another which is
akin to it -viz., what power should be assigned to the mass of freemen
and citizens, who are not rich and have no personal merit- are both
solved. There is still a danger in aflowing them to share the great
offices of state, for their folly will lead them into error, and their
dishonesty into crime. But there is a danger also in not letting
them share, for a state in which many poor men are excluded from
office will necessarily be full of enemies. The only way of escape
is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial functions. For
this reason Solon and certain other legislators give them the power of
electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates to account, but
they do not allow them to hold office singly. When they meet
together their perceptions are quite good enough, and combined with
the better class they are useful to the state (just as impure food
when mixed with what is pure sometimes makes the entire mass more
wholesome than a small quantity of the pure would be), but each
individual, left to himself, forms an imperfect judgment. On the other
hand, the popular form of government involves certain difficulties. In
the first place, it might be objected that he who can judge of the
healing of a sick man would be one who could himself heal his disease,
and make him whole- that is, in other words, the physician; and so
in all professions and arts.
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