As, then, the physician ought to be
called to account by physicians, so ought men in general to be
called to account by their peers. But physicians are of three kinds:
there is the ordinary practitioner, and there is the physician of
the higher class, and thirdly the intelligent man who has studied
the art: in all arts there is such a class; and we attribute the power
of judging to them quite as much as to professors of the art.
Secondly, does not the same principle apply to elections? For a
right election can only be made by those who have knowledge; those who
know geometry, for example, will choose a geometrician rightly, and
those who know how to steer, a pilot; and, even if there be some
occupations and arts in which private persons share in the ability
to choose, they certainly cannot choose better than those who know. So
that, according to this argument, neither the election of magistrates,
nor the calling of them to account, should be entrusted to the many.
Yet possibly these objections are to a great extent met by our old
answer, that if the people are not utterly degraded, although
individually they may be worse judges than those who have special
knowledge- as a body they are as good or better. Moreover, there are
some arts whose products are not judged of solely, or best, by the
artists themselves, namely those arts whose products are recognized
even by those who do not possess the art; for example, the knowledge
of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user, or, in
other words, the master, of the house will be even a better judge than
the builder, just as the pilot will judge better of a rudder than
the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than the
cook.
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