This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies are
preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost opposite
principle of action. The nature of this latter method may be
gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy kingdoms, for
as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make the office of king
more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny is to make it more like
the rule of a king. But of one thing the tyrant must be careful; he
must keep power enough to rule over his subjects, whether they like
him or not, for if he once gives this up he gives up his tyranny.
But though power must be retained as the foundation, in all else the
tyrant should act or appear to act in the character of a king. In
the first place he should pretend a care of the public revenues, and
not waste money in making presents of a sort at which the common
people get excited when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from
them and lavished on courtesans and strangers and artists. He should
give an account of what he receives and of what he spends (a
practice which has been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will
seem to be a steward of the public rather than a tyrant; nor need he
fear that, while he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in want
of money. Such a policy is at all events much more advantageous for
the tyrant when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard,
for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely to
attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home, has
more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the citizens,
for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind.
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