Some
commands differ not in the thing commanded, but in the intention with
which they are imposed. Wherefore, many apparently menial offices are
an honor to the free youth by whom they are performed; for actions do
not differ as honorable or dishonorable in themselves so much as in
the end and intention of them. But since we say that the virtue of
the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, and that
the same person must first be a subject and then a ruler, the
legislator has to see that they become good men, and by what means
this may be accomplished, and what is the end of the perfect life.
Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has a
rational principle in itself, and the other, not having a rational
principle in itself, is able to obey such a principle. And we call a
man in any way good because he has the virtues of these two parts.
In which of them the end is more likely to be found is no matter of
doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature
and of art the inferior always exists for the sake of the better or
superior, and the better or superior is that which has a rational
principle. This principle, too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is
divided into two kinds, for there is a practical and a speculative
principle. This part, then, must evidently be similarly divided.
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