Wherefore
we should not practice virtue after the manner of the
Lacedaemonians. For they, while agreeing with other men in their
conception of the highest goods, differ from the rest of mankind in
thinking that they are to be obtained by the practice of a single
virtue. And since they think these goods and the enjoyment of them
greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues ... and that it
should be practiced for its own sake, is evident from what has been
said; we must now consider how and by what means it is to be attained.
We have already determined that nature and habit and rational
principle are required, and, of these, the proper nature of the
citizens has also been defined by us. But we have still to consider
whether the training of early life is to be that of rational principle
or habit, for these two must accord, and when in accord they will then
form the best of harmonies. The rational principle may be mistaken and
fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, and there may be a like
evil influence of habit. Thus much is clear in the first place,
that, as in all other things, birth implies an antecedent beginning,
and that there are beginnings whose end is relative to a further
end. Now, in men rational principle and mind are the end towards which
nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens
ought to be ordered with a view to them.
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