The habit of feeling pleasure or pain at
mere representations is not far removed from the same feeling about
realities; for example, if any one delights in the sight of a statue
for its beauty only, it necessarily follows that the sight of the
original will be pleasant to him. The objects of no other sense,
such as taste or touch, have any resemblance to moral qualities; in
visible objects there is only a little, for there are figures which
are of a moral character, but only to a slight extent, and all do
not participate in the feeling about them. Again, figures and colors
are not imitations, but signs, of moral habits, indications which
the body gives of states of feeling. The connection of them with
morals is slight, but in so far as there is any, young men should be
taught to look, not at the works of Pauson, but at those of
Polygnotus, or any other painter or sculptor who expresses moral
ideas. On the other hand, even in mere melodies there is an
imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially
from one another, and those who hear them are differently affected
by each. Some of them make men sad and grave, like the so-called
Mixolydian, others enfeeble the mind, like the relaxed modes, another,
again, produces a moderate and settled temper, which appears to be the
peculiar effect of the Dorian; the Phrygian inspires enthusiasm.
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